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ABSTRACT—This study compared fear learning acquired
through direct experience (Pavlovian conditioning) and
fearlearningacquiredwithoutdirectexperienceviaeither
observation or verbal instruction. We examined whether
these three types of learning yielded differential responses
to conditioned stimuli (CS1) that were presented un-
masked (available to explicit awareness) or masked (not
available to explicit awareness). In the Pavlovian group,
the CS1 was paired with a mild shock, whereas the ob-
servational-learning group learned through observing the
emotional expression of a confederate receiving shocks
paired with the CS1. The instructed-learning group was
told that the CS1 predicted a shock. The three groups
demonstrated similarlevelsoflearningasmeasuredbythe
skin conductance response to unmasked stimuli. As in
previous studies, participants also displayed a significant
learning response to masked stimuli following Pavlovian
conditioning. However, whereas the observational-learn-
ing group also showed this effect, the instructed-learning
group did not.
Learning is an adaptation that enables organisms to change
their behavior ﬂexibly in a ﬂuctuating environment. An im-
portant component of learning is the emotional reactions that
guide and facilitate action when the organism encounters ob-
jects and events that should be either avoided or approached,
depending on their potential impact on the organism’s survival
(Rolls, 1999). Although recent investigations have examined
the informative value of such emotional responses in humans
during cognitive appraisal (Katkin, Wiens, & O ¨hman, 2001),
decision making (Damasio, 1999), memory performance (Cahill
& McGaugh, 1998), and action selection (Bechara, Damasio,
Tranel,&Damasio,1997),thepotentiallymoderatingroleofthe
way events and objects acquire their values has been neglected
(for recent exceptions, see Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev,
2004; Phelps et al., 2001). When the method of emotional
learning has been examined, it has often involved Pavlovian
conditioning (e.g., LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995).
This is noteworthy because humans may acquire the bulk of
their knowledge of the emotional significance of objects and
events in their surroundings through social observation and
symbolic communication (Rachman, 1977).
Although no attempts have been made to systematically
compare aversive learning through ﬁrst-hand experiences
(Pavlovian conditioning) with learning of the same causal
contingencies through solely social observation (observational
learning) or verbal instruction (instructed learning), available
data suggest that emotional responses acquired through differ-
ent kinds of learning should exhibit both similarities and dif-
ferences. In addition, whereas some researchers claim that
the same underlying mechanism subserves different types of
learning (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), others argue that
different types of learning might draw on partially independent
systems (O ¨hman & Mineka, 2001). In this study, we aimed to
shed further light on these issues by, for the ﬁrst time, sys-
tematically comparing the impact of Pavlovian, observational,
and instructed learning in a fear-learning paradigm.
In the traditional Pavlovian fear-conditioning paradigm, a
conditioned stimulus (CS1—e.g., a face) that has been paired
with a naturally aversive unconditioned stimulus (UCS—e.g., an
electric shock) elicits a greater conditioned response (CR—e.g.,
autonomic arousal) than a control stimulus (CS ), which has not
beenpaired with theUCS.Inthis article,weuse thisterminology
to describe stimuli and responses in all types of learning.
In an observational fear-learning protocol, a fear response is
acquired without direct experience of the UCS. Instead, the
representation of another individual’s emotional expression can
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in humans (Hygge & O ¨hman, 1978), subjects were exposed to a
confederate’s fear reactions to either fear-relevant stimuli (e.g.,
snakes) or fear-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., ﬂowers). The results
showed that subjects readily acquired a fear response to the
stimulipairedwithafearexpressionintheconfederate,andthis
response was stronger for fear-relevant stimuli. A related set of
ﬁndings was reported by Mineka and her colleagues in a series
of studies on vicarious fear conditioning in monkeys (Mineka &
Cook, 1993; Mineka, Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984). In sum-
mary, these studies demonstrated rapid, strong, and persistent
learning following exposure to a conspecific’s fearful reactions
toa fear-relevantstimulus(i.e., asnake). Arecent study,usinga
learning protocol similar to the one used by Mineka et al., found
comparably strong and persistent fear learning in toddlers who
observed their mothers’ fearful expressions in response to fear-
relevant objects (Gerull & Rapee, 2002).
Another way of acquiring knowledge of the aversive qualities
of a stimulus in the absence of direct experience is through
language. Both clinical accounts that retrospectively identify
the etiology of phobic fears to fear-relevant stimuli (e.g., King,
Gullone, & Ollendick, 1998) and experimental studies involv-
ing stimuli ascribed fear-provoking qualities through storytell-
ing(Field,Argyris,&Knowles,2001)revealthatverbalinstruc-
tions are a potent means to fear learning. A number of studies
focusing on the physiological components of instructed fear
learning have shown that when participants are verbally in-
structed to expect a shock paired with the presentation of a
specific CS and then later exposed to fully visible CSs, they
display an arousal response that is similar to the one demon-
strated following Pavlovian fear conditioning (Grillon, Ameli,
Merikangas, Woods, & Davis, 1991; Hugdahl & O ¨hman, 1977;
Phelps et al., 2001).
AWARENESS AND EMOTIONAL LEARNING
It is unclear given current evidence whether or not the ex-
pressions of fears acquired by different kinds of learning are
supported by the same underlying system (O ¨hman & Mineka,
2001). One proposed way to dissociate learning systems, or
components of learning systems, is to establish that they pro-
duce qualitatively different outcomes if affected by a given
variable, such as awareness (Merikle & Reingold, 1992).
Awarenessof avisual CS can be manipulated through backward
masking, in which the CS (target) is presented briefly and im-
mediately followed by another stimulus (mask) that overlaps
with it spatially. The presentation of the mask interrupts the
processing of early visual information related to the target and
thus excludes awareness if successful (Marcel, 1983). This
technique is said to short-circuit explicit knowledge of CS-UCS
contingencies and to tap into information processing that is
partially independent of explicit awareness (O ¨hman, Flykt, &
Lundquist, 2000).
Although some investigators claim that emotional learning is
dependent on explicit awareness of stimulus contingencies
(Dawson, 1973; Lovibond, 2003; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), a
significant body of evidence indicates that these two processes
are independent under certain circumstances (Bechara et al.,
1995; Esteves, Dimberg, & O ¨hman, 1994; Mandel & Bridger,
1973; Morris, O ¨hman, & Dolan, 1998; Posner & Snyder, 1975).
In particular, the effects of Pavlovian fear conditioning may be
mediated by both explicit and implicit representations of the
CS-UCS contingency; this possibility is supported, for example,
by the results of studies in which subjects verbally reported
both expectancies and autonomic, emotional responses (O ¨hman
& Mineka, 2001).
In an experiment utilizing the masking paradigm subsequent
to Pavlovian fear conditioning, Esteves et al. (1994) paired
angry faces with electric shocks; happy faces served as the
CS . In the test phase, both unmasked and masked stimuli
were presented while skin conductance response (SCR) was
assessed. Subjects showed a greater response to the CS1 than
to the CS  in both the unmasked and the masked conditions,
results that are consistent with the ﬁndings of a number of
similar experiments using fear-relevant stimuli as conditioned
stimuli (e.g., Morris et al., 1998; O ¨hman & Soares, 1993). The
evidence that emotional responses are partially independent of
explicit awareness resonates well with recent ﬁndings in neu-
roscience indicating that the human brain comprises neural
circuits that support automatic processing of emotionally rele-
vant information (LeDoux, 1996) and that these circuits can
initiate emotional responses without explicit awareness of the
stimuli (e.g., Bechara et al., 1995; Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan,
2002; Morris et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998).
But are these emotional responses to fear-relevant stimuli
dependent on the way the emotional significance is acquired?
Todate,nostudieshaveinvestigatedtheroleofawarenessofthe
CSfollowingobservationalandinstructedlearning.Weaimedto
investigate the degree to which a learned emotional response is
modulated by (a) type of learning (Pavlovian, observational, or
instructed) and (b) awareness of the CS (unmasked or masked).
If fear learning through observation and fear learning through
verbal instruction engage representations in the same system as
Pavlovian conditioning, then all three kinds of learning may
produce similar emotional responses to the CS.
In order toisolatethe effects of the type of learning, we varied
the learning component while keeping other factors constant. A
systematic comparison of the emotional responses acquired
through different types of learning can be informative about
what components are necessary and sufﬁcient in order for
autonomic, emotional responses to be elicited, and what the
underlying processes are. In a broader perspective, such a
comparison can also help to clarify the role of perceptual and
symbolic representations acquired without direct aversive
experience in informing people about the emotional signiﬁ-
cance of certain situations, and is bound to have a considerable
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In the present experiment, we examined responses of a
Pavlovian-learning group in order to replicate earlier ﬁndings
(e.g., Esteves et al., 1994) demonstrating that Pavlovian con-
ditioning can produce a significant emotional response even
when fear-relevant CSs are presented without the subject’s ex-
plicit awareness. Two other groups of subjects were submitted
to similar test conditions following observational and verbally
instructed learning, respectively.
METHOD
Participants
One hundred ﬁfty-nine college students served in the experi-
ment. All participants gave informed consent and were paid for
their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to the
Pavlovian-, observational-, or instructed-learning group. Sub-
sequent to the experiment, explicit awareness of the masked
stimuli was assessed, and 25 subjects were excluded from fur-
ther analysis because they claimed to have seen the masked
CSs. In the data analysis, 14 additional subjects were excluded
because they displayed virtually no SCR (nonresponders).Also,
33 subjects were excluded because they showed no signs of
learning in the unmasked condition (Pavlovian learning,
n 5 11; observational learning, n5 8; instructed learning,
n 5 14). The ﬁnal sample consisted of 87 subjects—29 in each
learning group.
Apparatus and Material
The experiment took place in a sound-attenuated room. Sub-
jects were seated in a comfortable chair in front of a 20-in. CRT
Apple monitor that projected the stimuli synchronized with a
60-Hz vertical refresh rate. The images were taken from Ekman
and Friesen (1976) and consisted of three black-and-white
pictures of males. Two angry faces served as CSs, and a neutral
face served as a mask. Angry male faces were chosen because
only conditioning to fear-relevant stimuli has been reported to
survive masking (O ¨hman et al., 2000).
Theelectricshocksweredeliveredtotherightwrist through a
stimulator (Grass Medical Instruments, West Warwick, Rhode
Island) charged by a stabilized current. SCR was measured
through Ag-AgCl electrodes, which were ﬁlled with standard
NaCl electrolyte gel and attached to the distal phalanges of the
second and third digits of the left hand. The SCR signal was
ampliﬁedandrecordedwithaBIOPACSystems (SantaBarbara,
California) skin conductance module connected to a Macintosh
computer. Data were continuously recorded at a rate of 200
samples per second. An off-line analysis of the analogue SCR
waveforms was conducted with AcqKnowledge software (BIO-
PAC Systems Inc., Goleta, California).
Design and Procedure
The experiment had a 3 (learning group: Pavlovian vs. obser-
vational vs. instructed learning)   2 (stimulus type: CS1 vs.
CS )   2 (masking condition: unmasked vs. masked) mixed
design. Each angry face served as both CS1 and CS , coun-
terbalanced across subjects, and the faces were presented in
one of two pseudorandomized orders. The experiment com-
prised three phases: habituation (8 trials), acquisition (24 tri-
als), and extinction (20 trials). Each phase was divided equally
among four trial types (CS1 unmasked, CS  unmasked, CS1
masked, and CS  masked). Each trial lasted for 6s. In the
unmasked trials, CSs were presented for 6s, and reinforced
CS1trialsterminated withashock.Onlyunmaskedtrialsinthe
Pavlovian-learning group were reinforced. In the masked trials,
CSs were presented for 33 ms (two multiples of the 16.5-ms
refresh rate) and immediately followed by the mask (5,973 ms).
A 33-ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was selected be-
causeitisknowntoproducechancelevelrecognitionofmasked
angry faces (Esteves & O ¨hman, 1993). The intertrial interval
(ITI) varied between 12 and 15s.
Initially, all participants were told that the purpose of the
study was to measure physiological responses to pictures of
human faces and that electric shocks were going to be admin-
istered during the experiment. After participants were seated,
the shock and the SCR electrodes were attached.
In the Pavlovian-learning group, the amplitude of the shock
was determined individually by a work-up procedure, which
terminated when the shock was reported to be ‘‘uncomfortable,
but not painful.’’ Participants were given no information about
the stimuli contingency before or during the experiment. To
determinethebaselineSCRtoboth unmasked andmasked CSs,
we included two unreinforced presentations of each trial type
(habituation phase). In the subsequent acquisition phase (six
trials of each type), participants received six shocks that co-
terminated with the presentations of the unmasked CS1 (i.e.,
delayed conditioning). No shocks were given to the unmasked
CS  and the masked CS1 or CS . Our masking procedure was
modeled on a well-established paradigm in which an unmasked
CS1 is paired with a shock and then the CR to both unmasked
and masked stimuli is assessed (e.g., Esteves et al., 1994;
Morris et al., 1998; O ¨hman & Soares, 1993). Two unmasked
CS1 trials always preceded the ﬁrst masked trial, toensure that
learning occurred before the presentation of the ﬁrst masked
trial. During the extinction phase (ﬁve trials of each type), no
more shocks were administered.
In the observational-learning group, no initial calibration
procedure was performed. Participants were told that they
would ﬁrst watch a movie of another person participating in an
experiment that was identical to the one in which they them-
selves would subsequently participate (except for being short-
er). They were told that the experiment contained three phases
and that at least one and at most three shocks would be ad-
ministered during the second phase. They were also informed
824 Volume 15—Number 12
Learned Fear of ‘‘Unseen’’ Facesthat shocks would be paired with the same stimulus during the
experiment as in the movie, but that the order of the shocks
within the second phase would be randomized. After the movie
ended (5min and 12s), participants were briefly reminded of
the instructions and then told that the experiment would begin.
The stimuli were then presented using a procedure identical to
the procedure for the Pavlovian group except that no shocks
were administered.
The instructed-learning group, like the observational group,
didnot calibratethe shock level. Participantsinthis group were
initially informed that they were not going to receive any shocks
during the ﬁrst phase of the experiment. After the end of the
habituation phase, the experiment was briefly interrupted, and
participants were shown the CS1 and told by the experimenter
that they would receive at least one and at most three shocks
paired with this face. They were then shown the CS  and the
mask while being assured that they should not expect any
shocks paired with these faces, nor in between trials. The test
protocol that followed was identical to the acquisition phase in
thePavlovianprotocolexceptthatnoshockswereadministered.
After the last acquisition trial, the experiment was interrupted,
and subjects were assured that no shocks would be adminis-
tered throughout the remaining trials (extinction phase).
When asked at the end of the experiment, all participants in
the observational and instructed groups reported that they be-
lieved the instructions and thus expected at least one shock.
Subsequently, in order to assess explicit awareness of the
masked stimuli, we asked participants whether they noticed
anythingpeculiarwiththedisplayoftheneutralface.Theywere
then asked whether they saw another image preceding the
neutral face. Participants who reported having seen the masked
faces were excluded from analysis. Finally, participants were
debriefed and paid for their participation.
Scoring of Responses
SCR was measured for each trial as the peak-to-peak amplitude
difference in skin conductance to the ﬁrst response (in micro-
siemens) in the 0.5- to 4.5-s latency window following stimulus
onset. The minimal response criterion was 0.02mS. The raw
SCR scores were square-root transformed to normalize the
distributions.
RESULTS
All trials were used to produce four average scores per subject
(CS1 and CS  for both unmasked and masked conditions),
except that in the unmasked Pavlovian condition, only Trials 2
through 6 were used because the CS1 was not predictive of the
UCS until after its ﬁrst association with the shock. Separate
analyses of variance were computed for the habituation, ac-
quisition, and extinction phases. Data were analyzed separately
for unmasked and masked trials. Learning group served as the
between-subjects variable, whereas stimulus type (CS1 vs.
CS ) was the within-subjects repeated measure.
Habituation
In the habituation phase, no significant differences were found.
Acquisition
Mean responses during the acquisition phase are presented in
Figure 1. SCRs to CS1 trials were significantly larger than
SCRstoCS trialsforbothunmaskedtrials,F(1,84)5 120.18,
p < .001, Zp
2 ¼ :59, and masked trials, F(1, 84)5 7.52,
p < .01, Zp
2 ¼ :08. Because only subjects who showed a posi-
tive differential response between the unmasked CS1 and
CS  (indicating thatlearningwas present) wereselected forthe
statistical analysis in the ﬁrst place, subsequent analyses of the
acquisition data focused on the masked condition.
Therewasamarginallysignificantdifferencebetweenmasked
CS1 trials and masked CS  trials in the Pavlovian group,
t(28)51.92, p5.06 (two-tailed), Cohen’s d50.37. An earlier
study using an experimental paradigm similar to ours found a
pronounced attenuation of the differential SCR over masked test
trials (Esteves et al., 1994). Esteves et al. argued that joint
presentation of the unreinforced CS1 with the mask may cause
the mask to become an inhibitory stimulus, gradually inhibiting
theresponsetotheCS1.Thisreasoningwascorroboratedbythe
present results: The difference between masked CS1 and CS 
trials was significant when the ﬁrst ﬁve trials, rather than all six,
were used to produce the average (the same number as in the
unmasked Pavlovian condition), t(28)52.27, p < .05, Cohen’s
d50.41. This result, which was predicted, indicates that ex-
plicit awareness was not necessary to elicit a differential re-
sponse following Pavlovian conditioning.
Theobservationalgroupalsodisplayedasignificantdifferential
response to masked faces (CS1 vs. CS ), t(28)52.22, p < .05,
Cohen’s d50.36. For the instructed group, however, SCRs did
not differ between CS1 and CS  trials, t(28) 50.66, p5.52.
Extinction
The differential responding to CS1 versus CS  in unmasked
trials resisted extinction in all three learning groups—Pavlov-
ian, t(28) 5 3.66, p 5 .001, Cohen’s d5 0.62; observational,
t(28) 5 4.21, p < .001, Cohen’s d5 0.83; instructed, t(28) 5
2.09, p < .05, Cohen’s d 5 0.32. However, there was a signif-
icant interaction between stimulus type (CS1 vs. CS ) and
learning group, F(2, 84) 5 4.07, p < .05, Zp
2 ¼ :09. Post hoc
comparisons (with Bonferroni correction) revealed less extinc-
tion in the observational than in the instructed group, p < .05,
and marginally less extinction in the Pavlovian than
in the instructed group, p 5 .08. There were no significant
effectsinthemaskedconditions.Recallthatjustbeforethestart
of the extinction phase, the instructed group received explicit
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the observationalandPavloviangroupshadto graduallydiscover
this on their own. This difference may have contributed to the
observed group differences in resistance to extinction. It is in-
teresting to note that the differential response to CS1 versus
CS  remained significant in the instructed group despite their
being explicitly told that the shocks would terminate.
DISCUSSION
Pavlovian, observational, and instructed fear learning have
been examined in a variety of research traditions, using a range
of different paradigms. Although several similarities among
these types of learning have emerged (e.g., Mineka et al., 1984;
Phelps et al., 2001), important differences are also apparent
(O ¨hman & Mineka, 2001). However, until now, no systematic
comparison of the differential impact of different types of
learning on learned autonomic responses has been conducted.
Our aim was to provide such a comparison by submitting the
three kinds of fear learning to similar test conditions.
In the acquisition phase, the differentially greater SCR for
masked CS1 versus CS  found in the Pavlovian group repli-
cated earlier ﬁndings (e.g., Esteves et al., 1994) and gave us
conﬁdence in the effectiveness of the experimental methods we
were using. The observational-learning group also showed this
effect, a ﬁnding that is consistent with studies reporting be-
havioral and psychophysiological manifestations of fast, strong,
and persistent learning in observational-learning paradigms in
both human (e.g., Hygge & O ¨hman, 1978) and nonhuman pri-
mates (e.g., Mineka & Cook, 1993). Recent ﬁndings of over-
lapping activations of neural networks that support one’s own
emotional expressions and the perception of emotions in others
(Adolphs, 2002; Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi,
2003) provide one possible explanation for the strong mani-
festations of fear learning following observation. Thus, in
shaping an aversive response to a stimulus, the perception of
fear reactions in another individual may serve as a UCS that is
as powerful as the corresponding ﬁrst-person experience.
The absence of the same data pattern in the instructed group
shows that the expression of fear learned through verbal in-
structions does not survive masked presentations. Although
abstract representations of associations between specific ob-
jects and their aversive implications are enough to prepare
the individual for action and guide his or her behavior, the
individual will express an emotional response only if these
representations are accompanied by explicit awareness of
the target. Recent ﬁndings on the lateralization of amygdala
activity may shed some light on the reasons for the absence of a
differential SCR to masked stimuli following instructed learn-
ing. Two recent studies demonstrated that stimuli that are
verbally linked to an aversive outcome activate mainly the
left amygdala (Funayama, Grillon, David, & Phelps, 2001;
Phelps et al., 2001), whereas other studies have suggested that
masked presentations of aversively conditioned stimuli engage
Fig. 1. Mean skin conductance response to the conditioned stimulus (CS1) and control stimulus (CS ) in the ac-
quisitionphaseasafunctionoflearninggroup.Resultsfortheunmaskedandmaskedconditionsareshownseparately.
Responses are estimated in microsiemens and square-root transformed. Error bars show standard errors. Significant
differences between response to the CS1 and CS  are indicated as follows: wp5.06, np < .05 (two-tailed).
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& Karcher, 2001).
The current study employed a subjective measure of explicit
awareness of the masked conditioned stimuli. A subjective re-
sponse is problematic for several reasons (for an overview, see
Holender,1986),most notably because it leaves the deﬁnitional
burden to the observer (Merikle & Reingold, 1992). However,
the practice of using a more conservative (objective) threshold,
such as chance performance on a forced-choice discrimination
task, is based on the false presumption that there is one
exhaustive measure of all aspects of consciousness (Merikle
& Joordens, 1997). Rather than making any claims about
the nature of conscious awareness, and in accordance with
earlier studies (e.g., Esteves & O ¨hman, 1993; Whalen et al.,
1998), we used verbal report by the subject as the indicator of
conscious awareness. Because our specific interest was in the
differential responses between learning groups, the potential
problems raised by a subjective measure were not critical to our
research hypotheses.
We have shown, for the ﬁrst time, that fear learning following
observation, like Pavlovian conditioning, need not be accom-
panied by explicit awareness of the CS for an emotional re-
sponse to be expressed. In contrast, knowledge acquired
through linguistic input does require explicit awareness of the
CS to produce an emotional response. In other words, although
some preferences need no inferences, others do. These results
also lend support to the notion that there might be partially
dissociable systems involved in different modes of emotional
learning. Pavlovian and observational learning, which humans
share with other primates, might be supported by an evolu-
tionarily old system that predates the emergence of language.
In conclusion, our results suggest that the emotional arousal
response to conditioned stimuli is mediated by both (a) how
learning is acquired and (b) the form in which the conditioned
stimuli are presented. Further studies are needed in order for
investigators to better understand the neural mechanisms un-
derlying these phenomena, as well as the wider implications for
social learning and behavior.
Acknowledgments––We thank Kristen Stedenfeld for her help
in data collection, Laura Thomas and Brett Sedgewick for their
technical assistance, and Arne O ¨hman and two anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of
this article. This study was supported by National Institutes of
Health Grant MH62104 to E.A.P.
REFERENCES
Adolphs, R. (2002). Neural systems for recognizing emotion. Current
Opinion in Neurobiology, 12, 169–177.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A.R. (1997). De-
ciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy.
Science, 28, 1293–1295.
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Adolphs, R., Rockland, C., &
Damasio, A.R. (1995). Double dissociation of conditioning and
declarative knowledge relative to the amygdala and hippocampus
in humans. Science, 269, 1115–1118.
Cahill, L., & McGaugh, J.L. (1998). Mechanisms of emotional arousal
and lasting declarative memory. Trends in Neurosciences, 21,
294–299.
Carr, L., Iacoboni, M., Dubeau, M.C., Mazziotta, J.C., & Lenzi, G.L.
(2003). Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans: A relay from
neural systems for imitation to limbic areas. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, USA, 29, 5497–5502.
Critchley, H.D., Mathias, J., & Dolan, J. (2002). Fear conditioning in
humans: The inﬂuence of awareness and autonomic arousal on
functional neuroanatomy. Neuron, 33, 653–663.
Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in
the making of consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Dawson, M.E. (1973). Can classical conditioning occur without con-
tingency learning? A review and evaluation of the evidence.
Psychophysiology, 10, 82–165.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. (1976). Pictures of facial affect. Palo Alto,
CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Esteves, F., Dimberg, U., & O ¨hman, A. (1994). Automatically elicited
fear: Conditioned skin conductance responses to masked facial
stimuli. Cognition and Emotion, 8, 393–413.
Esteves, F., & O ¨hman, A. (1993). Masking the face: Recognition of
emotional facial expressions as a function of the parameters of
backward masking. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 34,
1–18.
Field, A.P., Argyris, N.G., & Knowles, K.A. (2001). Who’s afraid of
the big bad wolf: A prospective paradigm to test Rachman’s
indirect pathways in children. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
39, 1259–1276.
Funayama, E.S., Grillon, C.G., Davis, M., & Phelps, E.A. (2001). A
double dissociation in the affective modulation of startle in hu-
mans: Effects of unilateral temporal lobectomy. Journal of Cog-
nitive Neuroscience, 13, 721–729.
Gerull, F.C., & Rapee, R.M. (2002). Mother knows best: Effects of
maternal modeling on the acquisition of fear and avoidance be-
haviour in toddlers. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40,
279–287.
Grillon, C., Ameli, R., Merikangas, K., Woods, S.W., & Davis, M.
(1991). Fear-potentiated startle: Effects of anticipatory anxiety on
the acoustic blink reﬂex. Psychophysiology, 28, 588–595.
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E.U., & Erev, I. (2004). Decisions from
experience and the effect of rare events in risky choice. Psycho-
logical Science, 15, 534–539.
Holender, D. (1986). Semantic activation without conscious awareness
in dichotic listening, parafoveal vision, and visual masking: A
survey and appraisal. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 1–66.
Hugdahl, K., & O ¨hman, A. (1977). Effects of instruction acquisition
and extinction of electrodermal responses tofear-relevant stimuli.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and
Memory, 3, 608–618.
Hygge, S., & O ¨hman, A. (1978). Modeling processes in the acquisition
of fears: Vicarious electrodermal conditioning to fear-relevant
stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36,
271–279.
Katkin, E.S., Wiens, S., & O ¨hman, A. (2001). Nonconscious fear
conditioning, visceral perception and the development of gut
feelings. Psychological Science, 2, 366–370.
Volume 15—Number 12 827
Andreas Olsson and Elizabeth A. PhelpsKing, N.J., Gullone, E., & Ollendick, T.H. (1998). Etiology of child-
hood phobias: Current status of Rachman’s three pathways theory.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 297–309.
LaBar, K.S., LeDoux, J.E., Spencer, D.D., & Phelps, E.A. (1995).
Impaired fear conditioning following unilateral temporal lobec-
tomy in humans. Journal of Neuroscience, 15, 6846–6855.
LeDoux, J. (1996). The emotional brain: The mysterious underpinnings
of emotional life. New York: Touchstone.
Lovibond, P.F. (2003). Causal beliefs and conditioned responses:
Retrospective revaluation induced by experience and by in-
struction.JournalofExperimentalPsychology:Learning,Memory,
and Cognition, 29, 97–106.
Lovibond, P.F., & Shanks, D.R. (2002). The role of awareness in
Pavlovian conditioning: Empirical evidence and theoretical im-
plications. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior
Processes, 28, 3–26.
Mandel, I.J., & Bridger, W.H. (1973). Is there classical conditioning
without cognitive expectancy? Psychophysiology, 10, 87–90.
Marcel, A. (1983). Conscious and unconscious perception: An ap-
proach to the relations between phenomenal experience and
perceptual processes. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 238–300.
Merikle, P.M., & Joordens, S. (1997). Measuring unconscious inﬂu-
ences. In J.D. Cohen & J.W. Schooler (Eds.), Scientific approaches
to consciousness (pp. 109–123). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Merikle, P.M., & Reingold, E.M. (1992). Measuring unconscious per-
ceptual processes. In R.F. Bornstein & T.S. Pitman (Eds.), Per-
ception without awareness: Cognitive, clinical, and social
perspectives (pp. 55–80). New York: Guilford Press.
Mineka, S., & Cook, M. (1993). Mechanisms involved in the observa-
tional conditioning of fear. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 122, 23–38.
Mineka, S., Davidson, M., Cook, M., & Keir, R. (1984). Observational
conditioning of snake fear in rhesus monkey. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 93, 355–372.
Morris, J.S., O ¨hman, A., & Dolan, R.J. (1998). Conscious and uncon-
sciousemotionallearningintheamygdala.Nature,393,467–470.
O ¨hman, A., Flykt, A., & Lundquist, D. (2000). Unconscious emotion:
Evolutionary perspectives, psychophysiological data, and neu-
ropsychologicalmechanisms. InR.D.Lane&L.Nadel(Eds.),The
cognitive neuroscience of emotion (pp. 296–327). New York:
Oxford University Press.
O ¨hman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness:
Towardanevolvedmoduleoffearandfearlearning.Psychological
Review, 108, 483–522.
O ¨hman,A.,&Soares,J.(1993).Ontheautomaticnatureofphobicfear:
Conditioned electrodermal responses to masked fear-relevant
stimuli. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 121–132.
Peper, M., & Karcher, S. (2001). Differential conditioning to facial
emotional expressions: Effects of hemispheric asymmetries and
CS identiﬁcation. Psychophysiology, 38, 936–950.
Phelps, E.A., O’Connor, K.J., Gateby, J.J., Grillon, C., Gore, J.C., &
Davis, M. (2001). Activation of the amygdala by cognitive rep-
resentations of fear. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 437–441.
Posner, M.I., & Snyder,C.R.R. (1975). Attention and cognitive control.
In R.L. Solso (Ed.), Information processing and cognition: The
Loyola Symposium (pp. 55–85). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rachman, S. (1977). The conditioning theory of fear acquisition:
A critical examination. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 19,
439–447.
Rolls,E.T.(1999).Thebrainandemotion.NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press.
Whalen, P.J., Rauch, S.L., Etcoff, N.L., McInerney, S.C., Lee, M.B., &
Jenike, M.A. (1998). Masked presentations of emotional facial
expressions modulate amygdala activity without explicit knowl-
edge. Journal of Neuroscience, 18, 411–418.
(RECEIVED 9/17/03; REVISION ACCEPTED 3/1/04)
828 Volume 15—Number 12
Learned Fear of ‘‘Unseen’’ Faces